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Abstract
In a two-period overlapping generations model, this paper demonstrates that the
relationship between environmental taxation and economic activity (output level and
output growth) becomes inverted-U shaped when the detrimental impact of pollution
on health and the private decision of each working-age agent to improve her health
are taken into account. In particular, a tighter environmental tax is more likely to
promote (rather than to harm) output-level and -growth when health is very sensitive
to pollution, the weight of health in preferences is high, the polluting capacity of the
production technology is high and the rate of natural purification of pollutants is low.
The inverted-U shaped relationship between environmental tax and economic ac-
tivity is due to a positive effect arising from the competition for resources between the
final output sector and the health-enhancing activities. This offsets the conventional
detrimental “drag-down effect” for low values of the environmental tax.
We also demonstrate that the link between environmental tax and lifetime welfare
is inverted-U shaped as well. Finally, we investigate the social optimum and the
determinants of the optimal environmental tax.
Keywords : Growth; Environment; Health; Overlapping generations.
∗address: Nantes Atlantique Université, Laboratoire d’Économie de Nantes (len), Chemin de la Censive
du Tertre, BP 52231, 44322 Nantes Cedex 3, France.
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1 Introduction
Is environmental policy harmful to economic activity, both in terms of output level and
growth? Does the reduction of pollution imply such a heavy cost for the economy that
the gains from a better environment quality are not able to offset it? At the theoretical
level, the answers are not clear-cut.
The aim of this article is to contribute to the debate focusing on one of the more
striking features of pollution: its detrimental impact on health. In contrast to previous
works in the field that take into account the impact of pollution on life expectancy (i.e.
mortality), we focus our attention on the influence of pollution on illness and disability
(morbidity). Indeed, a growing set of empirical evidence finds a link between pollution and
chronic diseases such as cancer, diabetes, hypertension, stroke, heart disease, pulmonary
conditions and mental disorders, amongst others. Even if pollution is not the main source
of these diseases, it contributes as a factor favouring their emergence or their worsening.
In contrast to mortality which affects mainly the oldest old, illness and disability due
to chronic diseases primarily impacts the working-age population, leading to important
losses of productivity and rising health-expenditure for the 30-50 old age people. Devol and
Bedroussian (2007), from the Milken Institute, estimate that the seven common chronic
diseases represent $277 billion spent annually on treatment and a lost productivity equal
to $1.1 trillion per year for the United-States.
Rising health-expenditure for working-age people and the time they have to devote in
order to manage to their chronic disease creates competition for resources that could be
used in alternative ways, for example growth-led activities or final production activities.1
The main contribution of this paper is to demonstrate that such resource competition is a
channel of transmission between the environmental policy, economic activity and welfare,
when the detrimental impact of pollution on the health of the working-age population is
taken into account.
To demonstrate this point and analyze its implications, we use a two-period over-
lapping generations model, in the line with previous articles addressing intergenerational
environmental issues,2 introducing an explicit link between the environment and health.
1Competition for resources in the relation between health and growth has already been studied in several
articles (see Dormont et al., 2007, for details and references). Nevertheless, most of these contributions
view better health as an increase in life expectancy. Empirically, Dormont et al. (2006) find changes in
morbidity that induce savings which more than offset the increase in spending due to population ageing.
2For example, John and Pecchenino (1994) who analyze the potential conflict between economic growth
and the maintenance of environmental quality when consumption degrades environmental quality while
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Following empirical evidence, we assume that health is negatively influenced by pollution
but is improved by the investment in health-enhancing activities made by each agent dur-
ing her working-age.3 Pollution is a by-product of final output production and in the
competitive economy the government taxes final output to limit pollution emissions.
Our first contribution is to demonstrate that if the detrimental effect of pollution on
health-status and an endogenous investment in health by the working-age are taken into
account, the link between environmental taxation and economic activity (final output level
and growth) is inverted-U shaped. Indeed, a tighter environmental policy has two opposite
effects. First, because the environmental tax is imposed on final output, it reduces the
rewards to production factor: the conventional “drag-down effect”. Second, it reduces
pollution and therefore improves health-status of the working-age population. Agents
reduce their investment in health-enhancing activities and the freed resources are used to
increase consumption and production. This second effect, called the “resource competition
effect” is positive. As a result, for low values of the environmental tax, the second effect
offsets the first one, and the environmental policy promotes the level and the growth rate
of output, as well as overall welfare.
Our second contribution is to show that the greater the room for improvement in the
health status, the more likely the environmental policy promotes economic activity and
growth. This occurs when the rate of natural health decay is low, the efficiency of health
care spending is low, the weight of health in preferences is high, the share of labor in final
output is high, the rate of natural purification of pollutants is low, the polluting capacity
of production technology is high, and the detrimental impact of pollution on health and
the elasticity of pollution stock with respect to the net flow of pollution are high. Most of
these criteria exist in the most developed countries, and because the detrimental impact
of pollution on health is well-documented worldwide, our results show that an active
environmental policy in these countries is highly probable to promote growth and output
levels: ie the positive gains in terms of health and growth should be higher than the losses
from factor rewards.
Finally, we investigate the social optimum and the optimal environmental tax. We
investment in environmental maintenance promotes it. See also John et al. (1995) who investigate the
effects of environmental taxation distinguishing the horizon of the agents and the economy. For models
with non-renewable resources, see Agnani et al. (2005), Kemp and Long (1979), Mourmouras (1991, 1993).
3Because we consider that agents are suffering from chronic diseases that required medical care when
they are young we do not assume that the poor health agents expend more on medical care when they
are elderly like Gutiérrez (2008). And, conversely to Williams (2002, 2003), we do not assume that agents
who are ill do not work.
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demonstrate that the higher the weight of health in preferences, the elasticity of pollution
stock with respect to the net flow of pollution, the detrimental impact of pollution on
health and/or the part of labor in production; the higher the optimal environmental tax.
The paper is set out as follows. Section 2 gives empirical evidence on the link between
pollution related illness and disability. Section 3 presents the model. Section 4 studies the
competitive equilibrium and the impact of environmental taxation on the steady-state.
Section 5 investigates the social optimum and the optimal environmental tax. Section
6 examines two extensions: AK endogenous growth and the impact of health on labor
productivity. Section 7 concludes.
2 Pollution, illness and disability
The majority of environmental economic contributions investigating the detrimental im-
pact of pollution on health focus on life expectancy.4 Nevertheless, pollution also affects
morbidity by favoring the development of certain chronic diseases that do not always lead
to death but have durable detrimental impacts in terms of illness and disability.
These chronic diseases, that include cancer, diabetes, hypertension, stroke, heart dis-
ease, asthma and obesity are a growing burden because they represent 60% of all deaths
worldwide and they are a major source of disability (see WHO, 2004, 2005). While they
greatly impact developing countries, they also represent a significant burden for developed
economies, such as the United-States, England, Canada, Israel, and Australia, as reported
by Suhrcke et al. (2006b) and Zhang et al. (2008) among others. Devol and Bedroussian
(2007) find that more than half of all Americans (55.8%) suffered from one or more chronic
diseases in 2003.
The causes of increased risk of developing chronic diseases are well-established: mainly
unhealthy diet, physical inactivity and tobacco use. Nevertheless, recent studies emphasize
the importance of environmental factors in the development and the worsening of some of
these chronic diseases, especially in developed countries. According to Briggs (2003) about
8-9% of the total disease burden may be attributed to pollution in developed countries.5
In the case of air pollution for example, it is well-documented that particulate matter
pollution, nitrogen dioxide, sulfur dioxide and ozone favour the onset of asthma crises and
aggravate respiratory diseases, and that carbon monoxide affects mental function... (for a
4Among others, see Jouvet et al. (2007), Mariani et al. (2008), Varvarigos (2008) or Pautrel (2008,
2009). The aforementioned articles by Gutiérrez (2008) and Williams (2002, 2003) are exceptions.
5See the 2003 special issue of the British Medical Bulletin (issue 1, volume 68) for related references.
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study on European countries see Katsouyanni, 2003). Particulate matter air pollution also
plays a role in the development (pathogenesis in medical terms) of cardiovascular disease
(Brook et al., 2004) and lung cancer (Pope et al., 2002), and it may be particularly harmful
to people with diabetes and people with hypertension (Pope and al., 2004). Moreover, air
pollution could be deleterious to vascular health especially for the people with diabetes
(Rajagopalan et al., 2005; O’Neill et al., 2005). Water pollution [Paulu et al. (1999),
Valent et al. (2004)] and industrial pollution [Nadal et al. (2004), Chen and Liao (2005),
Schuhmacher and Domingo (2006)] are also reported as detrimental to health.
Lang et al. (2008) recently found that higher unary BPA concentration (chemical pollu-
tion) is associated with cardiovascular diagnoses and with diabetes for adults. Smink et al.
(2008) show that children in the higher exposure group of HCB (a pesticide extensively
used before being banned in the United-States) have an increased risk of being overweight
and obese, even if the mother is normal weight. The epidemiological association between
persistent organic pollutants and diabetes has been also demonstrated by Rylander et al.
(2005) and Porta (2006). Even if such an association does not necessarily prove a causal
relation, as noted by Jones et al. (2008), such a relation could be biologically explained
(see Remillard and Bunce, 2002).
Furthermore, the link between obesity and diabetes seems to be dependant on pollu-
tion. Lee et al. (2007) find that the expected association between obesity and diabetes is
absent in people with low concentrations of persistent organic pollutants in their blood.
Furthermore, they find that the association between obesity and diabetes become stronger
as the concentrations of such pollutants in the blood increase. Lockwood (2002) give fur-
ther references on the association between exposure to dioxins and the development of
diabetes or altered insulin metabolism. He notes that obesity by itself may increase the
risk of diabetes: because insulin is concentrated in body fat, obese individuals are likely
to have an increased dioxin body burden that could explain the link between the rise in
the prevalence of diabetes and the “epidemic” of obesity (see also Ando et al., 2002, for
empirical evidence).
One important feature of chronic diseases is that they do not only affect the really
old. They also impact working-age people through illness and disability: according to the
World Health Organization (WHO, 2004) 56% of those suffering from some form of disease
are people aged 15-59 in high-income countries. Lakdawalla et al. (2004) demonstrate that
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disability increases more rapidly among the young while it decreases for the elderly. They
find that one factor is the growth in asthma which appears to be enough to explain
the change in disability rate. This is confirmed by Bhattacharya et al. (2008): “Recent
work has shown that rates of severe disability, measured by the inability to perform basic
activities of daily living, have been rising in working age populations. At the same time,
the prevalence of important chronic diseases has been rising, while others falling, among
working age populations. Chronically ill individuals are more likely than others to have
activity of daily living limitations. ” Perlkowski and Berger (2004) study the influence
of health on working conditions (wages and hours worked) making a distinction between
short-term and long-term illness and the age at which each illness appears (because it
implies different adjustments for young people at the beginning of careers and for old
people closed to retirement). They distinguish between temporary and permanent illness
and find that the adverse effects of permanent health problems peak at an age of onset in
the 40s for men and in the 30s for women. The biggest decline in wages and hours worked
are observed for individuals whose problems started at those ages.
This leads to a major economic impact in terms of labor productivity, labor supply,
education or savings, as shown by Suhrcke et al. (2006a). Chronic diseases mainly lead to
a reduction of the productivity of the labor-force (even if agents are not sick enough to
stop working or even if they are not sick but it is the member of the family who is sick)
and the increase in disability of working people. For the US in 2003, Davis et al. (2005)
estimated that 55 million workers out of 148 million, aged 19 to 64 reported an inability
to concentrate at work due to their own illness or that of a family member and 69 million
workers reported missing days due to illness. Regarding the effects of chronic diseases
on workers’ productivity, Blanc et al. (2001) demonstrate, with a sample of 125 adults in
Northern-California that “Both asthma and rhinitis negatively affect work productivity.
Those with asthma are less likely to be employed at all, while among those remaining on
the job, rhinitis is a more potent cause of decreased work effectiveness. The economic
impact of asthma and rhinitis and related conditions may be under-appreciated”. For
Australia, van Leeuwen et al. (2006) estimate that “while the impact of reduced work
effectiveness on days worked with pain on productivity is uncertain, it has the potential to
account for the majority of lost productivity costs associated with chronic pain.”. Devol
and Bedroussian (2007) from the Milken Institute estimate that the seven common chronic
diseases represent for the United-States, lost productivity equal to $1.1 trillion per year.
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The second important feature of chronic illness is that it places a burden on health
care and welfare systems. For the United States in 2003, Devol and Bedroussian (2007)
estimate that $277 billion is spent annually on treatment. All these resources could be
used in alternative activities promoting final (non health) consumption and growth. 6
Furthermore, chronic illness has major implications in terms of occupational choices,
that can not be supported (or funded) by the public health-care system or insurance con-
tracts. Since Grossman’s seminal work of 1972, in addition to goods, time appears as an
important input in the health production function by influencing the next period’s health
capital level. More recently, time and time costs in health production have become impor-
tant in the economic analysis of obesity, for example (see Cutler et al., 2003; Philipson and
Posner, 2008, among others). As emphasized by Mullahy and Robert (2008), increasing
levels of physical activity is now viewed as a means to improve health outcomes. In their
study based on the Bureau of Labor Satistics’ American Time Use Survey, Russell et al.
(2007) noted that 11.3% of American adults (in 2003-2004) reported spending time (mean,
108 minutes) on activities related to health on their designed day and 5.6% (86 minutes)
reported making medicine, giving themselves a shot, exercising or therapy for medical
reasons. Physical activity has been shown to reduce the risk of developing or dying from
heart diseases, diabetes, colon cancer and high blood-pressure. The US Department of
Health and Human services advises to be in good health, to do 150 minutes of physical
activity at moderate level or 75 minutes at vigourous level each week.
As a result, chronic illness forces agents to allocate more time to health-enhancing
activities, time they could use to home or market production. Thus, both the increase
in health-care expenditure and the rising investment in health-enhancing activities lead
to a competition for resources that could be detrimental for economic activity, growth
and/or welfare. And because pollution favours chronic illness and disability, this influence
could be a new channel of transmission between the environmental public policy and the
economy.
We investigate this point in the following sections.
6Here, we are reasoning for a given life expectancy and we do not consider that life expectancy may
rise or decrease. As a result, we do not integrate the fact that additional years of life increases health-care
expenditure (see Suhrcke et al., 2008, p.15).
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3 The model
Let’s consider an overlapping generations model. A new generation is born at each date
t = 1, 2, ..., and lives for two periods. The number of individuals born at time t is L.
Population is constant. Individuals are non-altruistic: the old do not care for the young
and the young do not care for the old. The preferences of an agent born in period t are
represented by the following utility (from van Zon and Muysken (2001)):
log
(
cφ1th
1−φ
t
)
+ θ log
(
cφ2t+1h
1−φ
t+1
)
where c1t and c2t+1 are respectively consumption in young and old age, ht and ht+1 are
respectively private health-status in young and in old age. Parameter θ = (1+ ι)−1 where
ι > 0 is the subjective discount rate of the agent. Parameter φ > 0 (respectively 1 − φ)
captures the relative importance of consumption (respectively health), in utility.7
Each young agent is endowed with one unit of time. She supplies νt ∈ [0, 1[ of this unit
of time in final production and uses her remaining time 1− νt as an investment in health
care activities to improve her health status.8 She earns a wage income νtwt where wt is
the wage rate.
The private health status of an agent born at period t evolves from period t and period
t+1 according to two opposing forces (Aisa and Pueyo (2004)). On the one hand, biological
processes involve a natural decay in health simply as time passes. Following Grossman
(1972) and Cropper (1981) we further assume that health depreciates over time with the
stock of pollution (denoted St). On the other hand, the time invested in health-enhancing
activities (1 − νt) mitigates against this deterioration. Therefore, for an agent born at t,
private health status evolves from period t to period t+ 1 as:
ht+1 − ht = η(1 − νt)− ξS
γ
t ht (1)
with η > 0 is a productivity scalar of health-enhancing activities.9. Parameter γ ≥ 0
7We do not integrate green preferences because we will assume in the following that health status is
affected by pollution.
8We could assume that there exists a sector that produces health care services with labor and therefore
a part ν of labor is allocated to manufacturing production and a part 1 − ν is allocated to health-care
production. We would find the same qualitative results (see Appendix A). Consequently, what we call
investment in health-enhancing activities could be viewed as health-care expenditure. Our modelling
has the advantage of leading to a simpler exposition of the model and the results. In Appendix E, we
demonstrate that results are not modified when leisure time is introduced.
9Note that here, we model a linear relationship between the health-enhancing activities and the evolution
of health-status which could be not empirically relevant. As demonstrated by Skinner et al. (2001): “nearly
20 percent of total Medicare expenditure appears to provide no benefit in terms of survival, nor is it likely
that this extra spending improves the quality of life”. Our assumption is made for simplicity.
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measures the influence of pollution stock on the natural decay ξ ∈]0, 1[.10
A consumer, born at t, works during the first period of her life, consumes an amount
c1t and saves the remainder of her revenue. The budget constraint of a young agent is
c1t + st = νtwt
where st denotes saving in youth. The budget constraint of an old person is
c2t+1 = (1 + rt+1)st
where rt+1 is the interes rate paid on saving held from period t to t+ 1.
Firms operate through perfect competition using physical capital and labor to produce
a final good with a constant return Cobb-Douglas technology:
Yt = A˜tK
α
t N
1−α
t , α ∈]0, 1[
where Yt is the aggregate output,Kt is the aggregate productive capital andNt is labor. A˜t
is a productive scalar, assumed as constant for the moment: A˜t ≡ A. Capital depreciates
fully in the production process.11
The stock of pollution S from period t to period t + 1 increases because of the net
flow pollution in the current period t and decreases according to the rate of natural pu-
rification of pollutants µ ∈]0, 1[. The net flow of pollution in period t is the ratio between
pollution emissions in period t, denoted Et, and the abatement activities funded by the
government, denoted Dt. We assume, as conventional, that polluting emissions arise from
final production such that
Et = zYt, z ∈]0, 1[
Parameter z measures the polluting capacity of the technology. Consequently the stock
of pollution in period t+ 1 is defined as:
St+1 =
(
zYt
Dt
)χ
+ (1− µ)St (2)
where χ > 0 is the exogenous elasticity of pollution stock with respect to the net flow of
pollution E/D.
10We impose γ ≥ 0 to investigate the absence of a detrimental impact of pollution on health, that is
γ = 0. Nevertheless, it is expected that γ > 1, that is the higher the stock of pollution, the higher the
detrimental effect of pollution, even if there is no empirical evidence on such a linear relationship.
11The production process is over the course of a generation. If the annual depreciation rate is 10% (which
is empirically relevant), 96% of the capital stock is depreciated over the course of a 30 year generation.
Therefore, we assume that capital is fully used up in the production process. Considering a positive
depreciation rate would not change the qualitative results.
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4 Competitive equilibrium
A representative agent born in period t maximizes her utility function taking wages, the
interest rate and the stock of pollution as given. She chooses consumption at both ages
(c1t, c2t+1) and the proportion of time νt she uses in production:
max
{c1t,c2t+1,νt}
log
(
cφ1th
1−φ
t
)
+ θ log
(
cφ2t+1h
1−φ
t+1
)
s.t.


c1t + st = νtwt
c2t+1 = (1 + rt+1)st
ht+1 = η(1 − νt) + (1− ξS
γ
t )ht
The first-order condition gives saving:
st =
(
θ
1 + θ
)
νtwt (3)
and the allocation of time into production:
νt =
φ(1 + θ)
η(1− φ)θ
ht+1 ∈]0, 1[ (4)
Because νt < 1, the health status of the old ht+1 is bounded to
η(1− φ)θ
φ(1 + θ)
.12
We assume that abatement Dt is provided by the government as a public good and
financed by an environmental tax τ on the source of pollution Yt such that the public
budget is balanced at each date: Dt = τYt. The law of motion of the stock of pollution,
given by equation (2) becomes:
St+1 =
(z
τ
)χ
+ (1− µ)St
Firms maximize their profit pit = (1 − τ)Yt − (1 + rt)Kt − wtNt and the demand for
capital and labor is
(1− τ)αYt/Kt = 1 + rt
(1− τ)(1− α)Yt/Nt = wt
The good market clearing yields:
Kt+1 = stL
and the labor market clearing equates labor demand Nt to labor supply νtL
Nt = νtL
12See van Zon and Muysken (1997, p.5) for a justification of the health status boundary. .
10
The competitive equilibrium may be summarized by the following relations:
Kt+1 = (1− α)
(
θ
1 + θ
)
(1− τ)AKαt (νtL)
1−α (5)
νt =
φ(1 + θ)
η(1− φ)θ
ht+1 ⇒ νt =
(
(1− φ)θ
φ(1 + θ)
+ 1
)−1(
1 + (1− ξSγt )
ht
η
)
(6)
ht+1 = η(1 − νt) + (1− ξS
γ
t )ht (7)
St+1 =
(z
τ
)χ
+ (1− µ)St (8)
The steady-state is defined here as an equilibrium where physical capital, private
health-status, pollution stock and the allocation of labor in production are constant at
K⋆, h⋆, S⋆ and ν⋆ respectively, defined as:
S⋆ = S(τ) ≡
(z/τ)χ
µ
(9)
h⋆ = H(τ) ≡ η
[
φ(1 + θ)
(1− φ)θ
+ ξ
(
(z/τ)χ
µ
)γ]−1
(10)
ν⋆ = V(τ) ≡ φ
[
φ+
ξ(1− φ)θ
(1 + θ)
(
(z/τ)χ
µ
)γ]−1
(11)
Consequently, the health status and the allocation of time in production are positively
affected by the environmental tax τ .
From equations (5), (10) and (11), the steady-state value of the physical capital stock
is:
K⋆ = A (1− τ)
1
1−αV(τ)
with A ≡
(
(1− α)
(
θ
1 + θ
)
A
)1/(1−α)
L. Because Y ⋆ =
1 + θ
θ(1− α)
(1 − τ)−1K⋆,13 we
obtain the steady-state value of final output as a function of the environmental taxation
τ :
Y ⋆ = A1 (1− τ)
α
1−α
(
B + ξ
(
zχ
µ
)γ
τ−χγ
)−1
with A1 ≡ B
(
1 + θ
θ(1− α)
)
A and B ≡
φ(1 + θ)
(1− φ)θ
.
13Note that Kt+1 = stL =
„
θ
1 + θ
«
νt(1− τ )(1− α)Yt/νt =
„
θ
1 + θ
«
(1− τ )(1− α)Yt.
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Proposition 1. When endogenous investment in private health-status and the detrimen-
tal impact of pollution on health are taken into account, the relationship between the
steady-state output and environmental taxation has an inverted-U shape.
Below (respectively above) an environmental tax-level denoted τˆ and defined as
χγξ
(
zχ
µ
)γ
τˆ−1 −
α
1− α
Bτˆχγ −
(
α
1− α
+ χγ
)
ξ
(
zχ
µ
)γ
= 0. (12)
a tighter environmental taxation raises (respectively lowers) the steady-state level of out-
put Y ⋆.
Proof. See Appendix B
To understand the basic mechanism of this result, let us remember that
Y ⋆ = A1 (1− τ)
α
1−α︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ia
V(τ)︸︷︷︸
Ib
(13)
Environmental tax influences the steady-state level of output through two channels:
the direct impact of the environmental taxation on the rewards to labor (see overbrace Ia
in equation 13) and the (indirect) impact on the allocation of labor in the manufacturing
sector (see overbrace Ib in equation 13).
The former (negative) is the conventional “drag-down” effect of the environmental tax
that reduces factor rewards – captured by (1−τ)
α
1−α . The latter (positive) is a new channel
of transmission due to the “competition for resources” between health enhancing activities
and production activities that affects the supply of labor into the final production sector
ν⋆ = V(τ). Because pollution has a detrimental impact on the evolution of private health-
status, by reducing the net flow of pollution and therefore the stock of pollution, the
environmental policy improves the private health-status of the agents. Consequently, each
agent decides to reduce her investment in health enhancing activities (1−ν⋆ decreases) and
to raise her labor supply to productive activities (ν⋆ increases). In this way, the tighter
environmental tax frees ressources that were allocated to health enhancing activities and
that are now reallocated to production, leading to a higher level of steady-state output
and a steady-state physical capital. Consequently the competition for resources between
output production and health enhancing activities associated with the negative impact of
pollution to health is a source of a new channel trough which the environmental policy
may promote economic activity.
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When γ = 0, the evolution of health-status is independent from pollution and therefore
the investment of each agent in health-enhancing activities is not affected by the environ-
mental tax: ν⋆ is independent from τ . In such a case, the competition for resources is
not affected by the environmental policy and only the “drag-down”effect remains: the
environmental policy is detrimental for growth. In the same way, the “competition for re-
sources effect” no longer holds when there is no endogenous investment in health-enhancing
activities.
Proposition 2. Endogenous investment in health and the detrimental impact of pollution
on health are two necessary conditions to obtain Proposition 1.
Proof. See above and Appendix B.
Considering the influences of parameters on the environmental tax-level τˆ , enables
us to understand why these two opposite effects of the environmental policy leads to
an inversed-U shaped relationship between the environmental tax and the steady-state
output level. These influences are summarized in the following table (see equation (12) in
Proposition 1 and Appendix B for the demonstration):
ξ η φ θ α µ z
− − − + − − +
Table 1. Parameter Changes and Responses of τˆ
Because it is cumbersome to obtain analytically the influence of γ and χ on the tax-level
τˆ , we use a numerical application. We first calibrate the model assuming that the length
of each period is 30 years, as usual in the literature. The first period covers ages 20 to 50,
and the second period covers ages 50 to 80. We use the U.S. economy as a benchmark.
From De La Croix and Michel (2002), we choose α and θ following the standard choice in
the RBC literature, that is α = 0.36 and a quarterly psychological discount factor equal
to 0.99. This implies that θ = 0.99(4×30) = 0.3. We use the calibration by van Zon and
Muysken (1997) for the values of ξ and φ. Finally, parameter η is chosen to obtain a
private health-status higher than unity to enable the welfare to be positive.
Benchmark value of parameters are summarized in Table 2:
α θ φ ξ A η L χ µ γ
0.36 0.3 1/2 0.2 50 0.8 1 1 0.5 1.5
Table 2. Benchmark value of parameters
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and the results of the numerical application is reported in Table 3
τˆ Yˆ νˆ⋆ hˆ⋆ Sˆ⋆ Wˆ ⋆
Benchmark 21.6% 9.73 0.896 2.068 1.84 1.28
γ = 0.5 7.77% 10.77 0.90 2.089 5.15 1.46
γ = 1 15.73% 10.12 0.894 2.065 2.54 1.35
γ = 2 25.97% 9.48 0.901 2.080 1.54 1.23
γ = 2.5 29.13% 9.31 0.907 2.094 1.37 1.20
χ = 1.25 23.14% 9.769 0.909 2.099 1.667 1.28
χ = 1.5 24.07% 9.821 0.921 2.125 1.515 1.29
χ = 1.75 24.65% 9.875 0.930 2.146 1.387 1.293
χ = 2 25.01% 9.928 0.937 2.163 1.279 1.298
Table 3. Steady-state τˆ for different values of γ and χ
The third proposition stems from the Table 1 and Table 3.
Proposition 3. When the negative impact of the environment on health and the endoge-
nous decision of each agent to invest her resources in health enhancing activities are taken
into account, we demonstrate that the environmental taxation will be more likely to im-
prove the steady-state level of output if the rate of natural health decay (ξ) is low, the
efficiency of health care spending (η) is low, the weight of health in preferences (1− φ) is
high, the share of labor in final output (1− α) is high, the rate of natural purification of
pollutants (µ) is low, the polluting capacity of production technology (z) is high, and the
detrimental impact of pollution on health (γ) and the elasticity of pollution stock with
respect to the net flow of pollution χ are high.
Proof. See Appendix B and Table 3.
When the detrimental effects of a dirty environment on health are great, the gains
in terms of health status of reducing the pollutant emissions are very significant and the
“competition for resources effect” that leads to an increase in labor supply has a greater
influence than the “drag-down effect” that reduces factor rewards and as a consequence
saving and physical capital accumulation. Neverthless, these positive gains diminish with
the increase in the tax rate because the possible improvements in health-status due to
the tax are reduced. At the same time, the losses from the reduction of factor rewards
increase in the tax rate such that for the environmental tax-level τˆ , they offset the gains,
and a further increase in τ leads to a decrease in the steady-state output level.
Consequently, the greater the room for improving the environment and private health-
status through environmental policy, the more beneficial the environmental policy is likely
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to be for the economy.
The numerical application also enables us to investigate the impact of environmental
taxation on the steady-state lifetime welfare, as well. As shown by Figure 1, there is a
relationship that is inverted-U shaped for similar reasons as the relationship between the
steady-state output and the environmental tax is inverted-U shaped.
Figure 1: Steady-state lifetime welfare as a function of τ
5 Social optimum and the optimal environmental taxation
The purpose of this section is to investigate the determinants of the optimal environmental
taxation in the presence of endogenous investment in private health and the detrimental
impact of pollution on private health.
In the centralized economy, the central planner aims at maximizing the welfare of
agents:
max
{c1,c2,ν,K,D}
log
(
cφ1h
1−φ
)
+ θ log
(
cφ2h
1−φ
)
s.t.


Y = AKα(νL)1−α = Lc1 + Lc2 +D +K
h = η(1 − ν)/(ξSγ)
S = (E/D)χ/µ
E = zY
As demonstrated in Appendix C, consumption at a young and old age are related14
c¯1 = θc¯2
14A bar ¯ denotes optimal value.
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with
c¯1 =
(1− α)φ
α(1 + θ)
(
Aαφ
(1− α)χγ(1 − φ) + φ
)1/(1−α)
The optimal allocation of time to production is:
ν¯ = φ
and the optimal stock of physical capital is
K¯ =
(
Aαφ
(1− α)χγ(1 − φ) + φ
)1/(1−α)
φL
Consequently, the optimal final output is
Y¯ = A1/(1−α)
(
αφ
(1− α)χγ(1 − φ) + φ
)α/(1−α)
φL
Abatement activity is given by
D¯ =
(1− α)χγ(1 − φ)
(1− α)χγ(1 − φ) + φ
Y¯
and the optimal stock of pollution in the steady-state is
S¯ =
(
z
(1− α)χγ(1 − φ) + φ
(1− α)χγ(1 − φ)
)χ
/µ
Consequently, the optimal value of the environmental tax that enables the decentralized
economy to attain the optimal stock of pollution in the steady-state is
τ¯ =
(1− α)χγ(1 − φ)
(1− α)χγ(1 − φ) + φ
(14)
The following proposition arises from this expression.
Proposition 4. The higher the weight of health in preferences (1 − φ), the elasticity of
pollution stock with respect to the net flow of pollution (χ), the detrimental impact of
pollution on health (captured by γ) and/or the share of labor in production (1 − α); the
higher the optimal environmental tax is.
Proof. From equation (14), it is straightforward that ∂τ¯/∂φ < 0, ∂τ¯/∂χ > 0, ∂τ¯/∂γ > 0
and ∂τ¯/∂α < 0.
Nevertheless, an optimal environmental tax is not sufficient to enable the steady-
state equilibrium to be optimal because in the decentralized economy the agents do not
internalize the impact of their labor supply decisions on final output and the net flow of
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pollution. Consequently, agents do not supply enough time to output production. Hence,
to obtain the optimal individual labor supply ν¯, the government have to subsidise health-
enhancing activities at a rate (see Appendix D):
τ¯ν = 1−
ξθ
(1 + θ)
(
zχ
µ
)γ ( (1− α)χγ(1 − φ)
(1− α)χγ(1 − φ) + φ
)−γχ
The environmental tax τ¯ associated with the subsidy τ¯ν make the steady-state decen-
tralized equilibrium optimal.
6 Extensions
6.1 AK endogenous growth
In this section, we consider that external learning by doing à la Romer (1986) exists ,15
such that the productivity scalar A˜t evolves as physical capital:
A˜t = AK
α
t
to obtain an interest rate independent from physical capital.
Consequently, the final output becomes
Yt = AKt(νtL)
1−α
and the law of motion of physical capital is given by
Kt+1 = (1− α)
(
θ
1 + θ
)
(1− τ)AKt(νtL)
1−α
At the steady-state, physical capital and output evolves at a constant positive rate of
growth g⋆ ≡ Kt+1/Kt − 1, that is, using equation (11)
g⋆ = A′(1− τ)
[
B + ξ
(
zχ
µ
)γ
τ−χγ
]α−1
with A′ ≡ (1 − α)
(
θ
1 + θ
)
AL1−αB1−α. The influence of the environmental taxation on
the growth rate at the steady-state is given by
∂g⋆/∂τ = −A′
[
B + ξ
(
(z/τ)χ
µ
)γ]α−1−1
τ−χγ×
[
B + ξ
(
z
µ
)γ (
1 + (1− α)χγ(1 − τ−1)
)]
15Following Romer (1986), production factors remain paid at their marginal after environmental tax
cost.
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Consequently ∂g⋆/∂τ > 0 if the last term in the right-hand side of the previous expression
is negative:
Bτχγ + ξ
(
z
µ
)γ (
1 + (1− α)χγ(1 − τ−1)
)
< 0
Because the left-hand side of the inequality is a monotonic increasing function of τ with
lim
τ→0
= −∞ and lim
τ→1
= Bτχγ + ξ
(
z
µ
)γ
> 0, there exists a unique τˆg defined as
Bτˆχγg + ξ
(
z
µ
)γ (
1 + (1− α)χγ(1 − τˆ−1g )
)
= 0
such that for τ < τˆg (respectively τ > τˆg) we have ∂g
⋆/∂τ > 0 (resp. ∂g⋆/∂τ < 0).
Proposition 5. Under the assumption of a learning-by-doing source of growth à la Romer
(1986), the introduction of an endogenous private health care expenditure and a detrimen-
tal impact of pollution on health makes the environmental taxation policy good for growth
when the level of taxation is not too high.
Proof. See above.
6.2 Health affects labor productivity
As emphasized in the introduction, chronic diseases affect the economy through the huge
losses of productivity they create. As a result, it is expected that a tighter environmen-
tal taxation will reduce this productivity loss by reducing pollution and increasing the
health-status of workers. To investigate how the “productivity effect” associated with
the “competition for resources effect” could further improve the beneficial impact of an
environmental policy, we introduce the impact of health on the productivity of labor.
We continue to consider that poor health agents expend more on medical care when
they are young and not elderly as does Gutiérrez (2008). We do not assume that ill agents
do not work (Williams (2002, 2003)). Instead we consider that a better health-status
makes workers more productive and that absenteeism due to illness does not occur.16
The technology to produce final output becomes:
Yt = AtK
α
t (h
ε
tNt)
1−α (15)
16We take into account presenteeism, i.e. a worker present but with reduced productivity rather than
absenteeism, i.e. a worker absent, because it accounts for not only worker health but also health of his
family. For the US in 2003, Davis et al. (2005) estimated that 55 million workers over 148 million ages 19
to 64 reported the inability to concentrate at work because of their own illness or that of their family.
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where ε ≥ 0 measures the effect of health on labor productivity. The introduction of
health-dependent labor productivity leaves the model unchanged except for the law of
motion of physical capital (equation 5):
Kt+1 = (1− α)
(
θ
1 + θ
)
(1− τ)AKαt (h
ε
tνtL)
1−α (16)
As a result, the steady-state value of physical capital becomes:
K⋆⋆ = A (1− τ)
1
1−αV(τ)H(τ)ε
and the steady-state expression of final output is now:
Y ⋆⋆ = A2 (1− τ)
α
1−α
(
B + ξ
(
zχ
µ
)γ
τ−χγ
)−(1+ε)
with A2 ≡ A1η
ε.
Proposition 6. When the effect of health on labor productivity is taken into account, the
positive effect of an environmental tax on ouput-level is enhanced and the tax level under
which a thigher environmental tax increases output level is higher. The environmental
policy is more likely to increase final output.
Proof. The tax level, denoted ˆˆτ , for which ∂Y/∂τ = 0 is
(1 + ε)χγξ
(
zχ
µ
)γ
ˆˆτ−1 −
α
1− α
B ˆˆτχγ −
(
α
1− α
+ (1 + ε)χγ
)
ξ
(
zχ
µ
)γ
= 0.
It is straightforward that for ε = 0, ˆˆτ = τˆ . Furthermore the LHS of the equation is
increasing in ε because ˆˆτ ∈]0, 1[. Therefore from the theorem of implicit function we find
that ∂ ˆˆτ/∂ε > 0. Therefore ˆˆτ > τˆ when ε > 0.
7 Conclusion
This paper investigates how environmental tax affects the economy (output-level and -
growth, welfare) when the detrimental impact of pollution on health is taken into account
and working-age individuals have to invest in health-care activities to limit the damaging
influence of pollution.
In a two-period overlapping generations model, this paper demonstrates that the rela-
tionship between environmental taxation and economic activity ( output level and output
growth) becomes inverted-U shaped, when the detrimental impact of pollution on health
and the private decision of each working-age agent to improve her health are taken into
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account. In particular, a tighter environmental tax is more likely to promote (rather than
to harm) output-level and -growth when health is very sensitive to pollution, the weight of
health in preferences is high, the polluting capacity of the production technology is high
and the rate of natural purification of pollutants is low.
The inverted-U shaped relationship between environmental tax and economic activity
is due to a positive effect arising from the competition for resources between the final
output sector and the health-care sector that offsets the conventional detrimental “drag-
down effect” for low values of the environmental tax.
We also demonstrate that the link between environmental tax and lifetime welfare is
inverted-U shaped as well. Finally, we investigate the social optimum and the determinants
of the optimal environmental tax.
This contribution shows that, besides life expectancy, there are other ways in which
pollution may affect health and health affect economic activity. Those ways may be new
channels of transmission of the environmental pollution to economic activity.
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Appendix
A The basic model with a health sector
Let us consider in this section, that there exists in the economy a health sector that
produces an amount Ht of health-care services at period t, using labour and the following
technology
Ht = AH(1− νt)
where AH is a productivity scalar and 1 − νt is the part of labour (normalized to unity)
allocated to the health sector.
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Firms in the health sector operate under perfect competition and maximize their profit
mtHt = wt(1− νt) such that:
mtAH = wt (17)
The final output sector is defined as in section 2.
In the competitive equilibrium, besides her consumption of final good, the consumer
buys when she is young Ht units of health care service for an amount of health-care
expenditure equal to mtHt. The private health status of the agent evolves between period
t and t+ 1 as:
ht+1 − ht = ηHt − ξS
γ
t ht
The program of the consumer consists in choosing consumption when young and old
and health-care services Ht in order to maximize her lifetime utility subject to her budget
constraint when young and old and the evolution of her health-status:
max
{c1t,c2t+1,Ht}
log
(
cφ1th
1−φ
t
)
+ θ log
(
cφ2t+1h
1−φ
t+1
)
s.t.


c1t +mtHt + st = wt
c2t+1 = (1 + rt+1)st
ht+1 = ηHt + (1− ξS
γ
t )ht
The first-order condition gives saving (using equation 17):
st =
(
θ
1 + θ
)
(wt −mtHt) =
(
θ
1 + θ
)
νtwt
Furthermore, νt is given by
ht+1 =
ηAH(1− φ)θ
φ(1 + θ)
νt
that is νt increases in ht+1. These two expressions are similar to those found when health-
care investment is in the form of time (see equations (3) and (4)) when AH = 1.
B Environmental taxation in competitive equilibrium
The influence of environmental tax on the steady-state level of output is given by:
dY ⋆/dτ = Y ⋆τ−γχ(1− τ)−1
(
B + ξ
(
zχ
µ
)γ
τ−χγ
)−1
×
[
χγξ
(
zχ
µ
)γ
τ−1 −
α
1− α
Bτχγ −
(
α
1− α
+ χγ
)
ξ
(
zχ
µ
)γ]
.
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The influence of environmental tax on the steady-state level of output is positive if
and only if
χγξ
(
zχ
µ
)γ
τ−1 −
α
1− α
Bτχγ −
(
α
1− α
+ χγ
)
ξ
(
zχ
µ
)γ
> 0
Because the left-hand side of the inequality is a decreasing monotonic function of τ with
lim
τ→0
= +∞ and lim
τ→1
=
−α
1− α
(
B + ξ
(
zχ
µ
)γ)
< 0, there exists a unique τ ∈]0, 1] under
which the inequality is verified. This τ is denoted τˆ and is defined as:
χγξ
(
zχ
µ
)γ
τˆ−1 −
α
1− α
Bτˆχγ −
(
α
1− α
+ χγ
)
ξ
(
zχ
µ
)γ
= 0.
When γ = 0, the left-hand side of the inequality is independent from τ and negative.
Consquently, when γ = 0, we have dY ⋆/dτ < 0.
To find how parameters affect the tax level τ , let rewrite the expression of τˆ as:
Γ(τˆ ;α, γ, ξ, µ,B, z, χ) ≡ Bτˆχγ +
(
1− α−1(1− α)χ
(
τˆ−1 − 1
)
γ
)
ξ
(
zχ
µ
)γ
= 0.
with B ≡ η
φ(1 + θ)
(1− φ)θ
and τˆ−1 > 1. Except for γ and χ, it is straightforward that ∂Γ(·)/∂ξ >
0, ∂Γ(·)/∂B > 0, ∂Γ(·)/∂α > 0, ∂Γ(·)/∂µ > 0, ∂Γ(·)/∂z < 0, ∂Γ(·)/∂τˆ > 0. From the
theorem of implicit function, we obtain
∂τˆ/∂ξ < 0, ∂τˆ/∂η < 0, ∂τˆ /∂φ < 0, ∂τˆ /∂(1−φ) > 0, ∂τˆ/∂θ > 0,
∂τˆ/∂α < 0, ∂τˆ/∂µ < 0, ∂τˆ/∂z > 0.
C The optimum
In the centralized economy, the central planner aims at maximizing the welfare of the
agents:
max
{c1,c2,ν,K,D}
log
(
cφ1h
1−φ
)
+ θ log
(
cφ2h
1−φ
)
s.t.


F (K, ν,L) = A˜Kα(νL)1−α = Lc1 + Lc2 +D +K
h = η(1 − ν)/(ξSγ)
S = (E/D)χ/µ
E = zY
The Lagrangian may be written as:
L = φ (log c1 + θ log c2) + (1 + θ)(1− φ) (χγ logD − χγ logF (K, ν,L) + log(1− ν))
+ (1 + θ)(1− φ) log
ηµγ
ξzγχ
+ λ (F (K, ν,L) − Lc1 − Lc2 −D −K)
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First-order conditions are
φc−11 = λL (18)
θφc−12 = λL
that is
c2 = θc1
λ(F ′K(·)− 1) = (1 + θ)χγ(1− φ)F
′
K(·)/F (·) (19)
(1− φ)(1 + θ)
(
γχF ′ν(·)/F (·) + (1− ν)
−1
)
= λF ′ν(·) (20)
λ = (1 + θ)χγ(1− φ)D−1 (21)
Equations (19) and (21) give:
D = Y (1− 1/F ′K(·)) = Y − α
−1K
Furthermore, from (18), we obtain λ =
φ
c1L
, consequently
D = φ−1(1 + θ)χγ(1− φ)c1L
and consequently the market equilibrium gives
Y = c1L(1 + θ)
[
1 + φ−1χγ(1− φ)
]
+K
that is
c1L =
Y −K
(1 + θ) [1 + φ−1χγ(1− φ)]
In the same way, the market equilibrium may be written as
Y = (1 + θ)c1L+K + Y − α
−1K
that is
(1 + θ)c1L = (α
−1 − 1)K
Consequently
Y −K
[1 + φ−1χγ(1− φ)]
= (α−1 − 1)K
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that is
Y = α−1φ−1 [(1− α)χγ(1 − φ) + φ]K (22)
Finally, equation (20) gives
(1− φ)(1 + θ)
(
(1− α)γχ+
ν
1− ν
)
=
φ(1 + θ)
(α−1 − 1)
(1− α)Y/K
that is
ν
1− ν
=
φ
1− φ
⇒ ν = φ
From (22), we can obtain the express of the steady-state physical capital in the cen-
tralized economy, denoted Kc:
K¯ =
(
Aαφ
(1− α)χγ(1 − φ) + φ
)1/(1−α)
φL
and from (22)
Y¯ = A1/(1−α)
(
αφ
(1− α)χγ(1 − φ) + φ
)α/(1−α)
φL
Finally
c¯1 =
(1− α)
α(1 + θ)
(
Aαφ
(1− α)χγ(1 − φ) + φ
)1/(1−α)
φ
and
D¯ =
(1− α)χγ(1 − φ)
(1− α)χγ(1 − φ) + φ
Y¯
D Subsidy to health-enhancing activities
We re-write the competitive equilibrium assuming that the government subsidises the
health-enhancing activities of agents by paying a subsidy τν to the opportunity cost of
health-enhancing activities (that is the foregone wage (1 − νt)wt) that is funded by a
lump-sum tax denoted at.
The budget-constraint for the young agent born at period t becomes:
c1 + st + at = νtwt + τ
ν(1− νt)wt
The maximization of lifetime utility gives st =
θ
1 + θ
(νtwt + τ
ν(1 − νt)wt − at) and
because government budget constraints require at = τ
ν(1− νt)wt, we obtain
st =
θ
1 + θ
νtwt
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and the individual labor supply is given by
νt =
(1 + θ)φ
θ(1− φ)
(1− τν)ht+1
In the steady-state equilibrium, the private health-status remains constant at:
h⋆ = H(τ) ≡ η
[
(1− τν)
φ(1 + θ)
(1 − φ)θ
+ ξ
(
(z/τ)χ
µ
)γ]−1
ν⋆ = V(τ) ≡ φ
[
φ+
ξ(1− φ)θ
(1− τν)(1 + θ)
(
(z/τ)χ
µ
)γ]−1
The higher the subsidy to health-enhancing activities, the higher the health-status in
the steady-state and the lower the individual supply of labor ν⋆.
The subsidy to health-enhancing activities that enables replication of the optimal al-
location of time between health-enhancing activities and production (denoted τ¯ν) is such
that ν⋆ = φ, that is
τ¯ν = 1−
ξθ
(1 + θ)
(
zχ
µ
)γ ( (1− α)χγ(1 − φ)
(1− α)χγ(1 − φ) + φ
)−γχ
E The competitive equilibrium with leisure
Up to this point, we investigated the competition for resources assuming that the time
unit at the disposal of the agent is divided between two different “occupational” activities:
production which enables an income to be earned and investment in health care which
enables the agent to stay in good health.
In this section, we consider that each agent also values leisure-time and that she may
adjust her leisure-time according to the level of her health-status: the healthier is the
agent, the greater the utility of one minute of leisure.
To do so, we continue to denote ν ∈]0, 1[, the percentage of time the agent chooses in
output production and we denote u ∈]0, 1[ the percentage of time spent as investment in
health status. Consequently 1− u− ν ∈]0, 1[ represents the percentage of time
To keep things simple, preferences are written as follows
log
(
cφ1th
1−φ
t (1− ut − νt)
φ1
)
+ θ log
(
cφ2t+1h
1−φ
t+1
)
with φ1 > 0 captures the weight of leisure in utility.
The law of motion of the private health-status (equation 1) is modified as follows
ht+1 − ht = ηut − ξS
γ
t ht
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and in the competitive equilibrium, the program of the agent is
max
{c1t,c2t+1,νt,ut}
log
(
cφ1th
1−φ
t (1− ut − νt)
φ1
)
+ θ log
(
cφ2t+1h
1−φ
t+1
)
s.t.


c1t + st = νtwt
c2t+1 = (1 + rt+1)st
ht+1 = ηut + (1− ξS
γ
t )ht
The expression of savings st is the same than equation (3) and the percentage of time
into output production νt is still given by equation (4). But now, the percentage of time
in health care expenditure:
ut = 1−
φ(1 + θ)
η(1 − φ)θ
ht+1 −
φ1
η(1− φ)θ
ht+1 = 1−
φ(1 + θ) + φ1
η(1− φ)θ
ht+1
and the percentage of time to leisure is
1− ut − νt =
φ1
η(1− φ)θ
ht+1
The competitive equilibrium may be summarized by the following relations:
Kt+1 = (1− α)
(
θ
1 + θ
)
(1− τ)AKαt (νtL)
1−α
νt =
φ(1 + θ)
η(1− φ)θ
ht+1
ht+1 = ηut + (1− ξS
γ
t )ht
ut = 1−
φ(1 + θ) + φ1
η(1− φ)θ
ht+1
St+1 =
(z
τ
)χ
+ (1− µ)St
In the steady-state, ν, u, h, S, K, Y remain constant. Consequently, the stock of
pollution in the steady-state S⋆ is always given by (9), and the private health-status is
h⋆ = η
[
B′ + ξ
(
zχ
µ
)γ
τ−χγ
]−1
with B′ ≡
φ(1 + θ) + φ1
(1− φ)θ
. When leisure is taken into account, health care expenditure is
lowered and the steady-state health status too, but the influence of the environmental tax
is not modified.
The percentage of time allocated to the output production is:
ν⋆ = B
[
B′ + ξ
(
zχ
µ
)γ
τ−χγ
]−1
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Finally, we obtain
Y ⋆ = A′1 (1− τ)
α
1−α
(
B + ξ
(
zχ
µ
)γ
τ−χγ
)−(1+ε)
with A′1 ≡ B
′
(
1 + θ
θ(1− α)
)
A.
Because A′1 < A1, the steady-state level of output is lower when leisure is taken into
account, but the effect of the environmental taxation in the steady-state level of output
and the expression of τ , the environmental taxation under which a higher tax promotes
economic activities, are not modified.
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